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Abstract. We here study the behavior of political party members aim-
ing at identifying how ideological communities are created and evolve
over time in diverse (fragmented and non-fragmented) party systems.
Using public voting data of both Brazil and the US, we propose a method-
ology to identify and characterize ideological communities, their member
polarization, and how such communities evolve over time, covering a 15-
year period. Our results reveal very distinct patterns across the two case
studies, in terms of both structural and dynamic properties.
Keywords: political party systems; community detection; complex net-
works; temporal analysis
1 Introduction
Party systems can be characterized based on their fragmentation and polariza-
tion [30]. Party fragmentation corresponds to the number of parties existing in
a political system (e.g., a country) while polarization is related to the multiple
opinions that lead to the division of members into groups with distinct political
ideologies [14,30]. In countries where the party system has a low fragmentation,
the polarization of political parties can be seen more clearly since one party tends
to occupy more seats supporting the government and the other opposes it [21].
On the other hand, in fragmented systems the multiple political parties often
make use of coalitions, a type of inter-party alliance, to raise their relevance in
the political system and reach a common end [2, 8]. Thus, a great amount of
ideological similarity, as expressed by their voting decisions, is often observed
across different parties.
Previous work has analyzed the behavior of political party members through
the modeling of voting data in signed and weighted networks [3, 4, 10, 11, 19, 24,
25,28]. These prior efforts tackled topics such as community detection, party co-
hesion and loyalty analysis, governance of a political party and member influence
in such networks. However, the identification and characterization of ideological
communities, particularly in fragmented party systems, require observing some
issues, such as: (i) presidents define coalitions throughout government in order to
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2 Analyzing Ideological Communities in Congressional Voting Networks
strengthen the implementation of desired public policies, which may be ruptured
after a period of time [8,20]; (ii) political members have different levels of parti-
sanship and loyalty, and their political preferences may change over time [3, 5];
and (iii) different political parties may have the same political ideology, being
redundant under a party system [23].
In such context, we here study the behavior of political party members aiming
at identifying how ideological communities are created and evolve over time. To
that end, we consider two case studies, Brazil and US, which are representatives
of distinct party systems: whereas the former is highly fragmented and redundant
[23], the latter is not fragmented but rather polarized with two major parties,
although some party members can be considered less polarized [11, 25]. Using
public datasets of the voting records in the House of Representatives of both
countries during a 15-year period, we characterize the emergence and evolution
of communities of House members with similar political ideology (captured by
their voting behavior) by using complex network concepts. Specifically, we tackle
three research questions (RQs):
– RQ1: How do ideological communities are characterized in govern-
ments with different (i.e., fragmented and non-fragmented) party
systems? We model the voting behavior of each House of Representatives
during a given time period using a network, where nodes represent House
members, and weighted edges are added if two members voted similarly. We
use the Louvain algorithm [7] to detect communities in each network and
characterize structural properties of such communities. Unlike prior com-
munity analysis in the political context, we compare the properties of these
communities in fragmented and in non-fragmented party systems.
– RQ2: How can we identify polarization in the ideological com-
munities? We use neighborhood overlap [13] to estimate the tie strength
associated to each network edge, characterizing it as either strong or weak.
This approach to estimate tie strength has been employed in several con-
texts [16,18,22,37] and also in the political context [35]. However, these prior
studies were not interested in analyzing and comparing distinct political sys-
tems, as we do here. We use strong ties to identify polarized communities in
each analyzed network.
– RQ3: How do polarized communities evolve over time? We analyze
how polarized communities evolve over the years of a government, charac-
terizing how the membership of such communities change over time.
In sum, the key contributions of our work are: (i) a methodology to identify
and analyze dynamic ideological communities and their polarization in party
systems based on complex network concepts; and (ii) two case studies covering
strikingly different party systems over a quite broad time period. Our study
shows that in fragmented party systems, such as Brazil, although party redun-
dancy exists, some ideological communities exist and may, indeed, be polarized.
However, such polarized communities are highly dynamic, greatly changing their
membership over consecutive years. In the US, on the other hand, despite the
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strong and temporally stable party polarization, there are members, within each
party, that exhibit different levels of polarization.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses
related work, whereas Section 3 describes our modeling methodology and case
studies. We then present our main results, tackling RQ1-RQ3 in Sections 4-6.
Conclusions and future work are offered in Section 7.
2 Related Work
Complex networks constitute a set of theoretical and analytical tools to describe
and analyze phenomena related to interactions occurring in the real world [29].
Among the many properties of a network, the interactions between pairs of nodes
can be used to define the strength of these links (or tie strength) [13]. Indeed,
tie strength is a property that has been widely studied in several domains. For
example, the tie strength between pairs of people was studied in the phone call
and Short Message System (SMS) networks, where a higher frequency of SMS
and longer call duration characterize stronger ties [37]. The different types of
interactions between Facebook users have also been used to define tie strength
on that system [18]. Similarly, tie strength was used to build geolocation models
based on Twitter data and exploited in the prediction of user location [22].
In the political context, the study of political ideologies has been largely ac-
complished through the analysis of roll call votes networks. In a roll call votes
network, the nodes represent people (e.g., congressmen), and two nodes are con-
nected if they have voted similarly in one (or more) voting sessions. In [3], the
authors studied the committee’s formation in the US House of Representatives
using roll call votes networks, finding that there is a cooperation between the
Democratic and Republican parties. Although the polarization in recent decades
has been increasing, there are moderate members in both parties, who cooper-
ate with each other. In the same direction, authors in [28] studied the commit-
tees and subcommittees of US House of Representatives exploiting the network
connections that are built according to common membership. Analogously, the
polarization in the US Senate was evaluated using a network defined by the
similarity of Senators’ votes [25].
In [11], the authors studied the relations between members of the Italian
parliament according to their voting behavior, analyzing the community struc-
ture with respect to political coalitions and government alliances over time.
Similarly, the cohesiveness of members of the European Parliament was inves-
tigated through the analysis of network models combining roll call votes and
Twitter data [10]. Other approaches study the behavior of political members
modeling roll call votes using signed networks. However, this type of analysis
is appropriate for modeling only polarized systems [4]. Signed networks have
also been used to evaluate aspects related to political governance and political
party behavior [19]. In addition, an algorithm was proposed to evaluate signed
networks and a case study was conducted using a European Parliament network
capturing voting similarities between members [24]. In [19], the roll call votes
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of the Brazilian House of Representative was modeled using signed networks.
The results revealed inefficient coalitions with the government as parties that
make such coalitions have members distributed in different ideological commu-
nities over time. Orthogonally, others have investigated the ideology of political
members and users through profiles of social networks [1, 12,34].
Unlike prior work, our focus here is on the characterization of ideological
communities in diverse, i.e., both fragmented and non-fragmented, party sys-
tems. We also propose to use tie strength, computed based on neighborhood
overlap, to identify polarized communities under the party systems diversities,
evaluating their evolution over time, on both party systems.
3 Methodology
In this section, we describe the methodology used in our study. We start by
presenting basic concepts (Section 3.1) followed by our case studies (Section
3.2), and then describe our modeling of voting behavior (Section 3.3).
3.1 Basic Concepts
The House of Representatives is composed of several members who occupy the
seats during each government period. House members participate in a series
of voting sessions, when bills, amendments, and propositions are discussed and
voted. Thus, attending such sessions is the most direct way for members to ex-
press their ideologies and positioning. When these members are associated with
a large number of political parties, the party system in question is regarded
as fragmented. In this case, during a term of office, coalition governments are
established, leading political parties to organize themselves into ideological com-
munities, defending together common interests during voting sessions [20,30].
One can evaluate the behavior of parties and their members in terms of how
cohesive they are as an ideological community by analyzing voting data using
widely disseminated metrics, such as Rice’s Index. However, the use of Rice
Index has been shown to be problematic when there are more than two voting
options (other than only yes and no) [17], as is the case, for example, in the
European Parliament and in our study, as we will see later.
Instead, we here employ the Partisan Discipline and Party Discipline met-
rics [23]. The former captures the ideological alignment of a member to her party
(estimated by the behavior of the majority), and the latter expresses the ideo-
logical cohesiveness of a party. Given a member m, belonging to party pm, the
Partisan Discipline of m, pdm is given by the fraction of all voting sessions to
which m attended and voted similarly to the majority of pm’s members. That is,
let n be the number of voting sessions attended by member m and I(m, pm, i)
be 1 if member m voted similarly to the majority of members of pm in voting
session i (i = 1..n) and 0 otherwise. Then:
pdm =
∑n
i=1 I(m, pm, i)
n
(1)
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The Partisan Discipline can be generalized to assess the discipline and ide-
ological alignment of a member to any community (not only his original party).
The Party Discipline of a party p is computed as the average Partisan Disci-
pline of all of its members, that is, PD(p) =
∑M
m=1 pdm
M , where M is the number
of members of p. Party Discipline captures how cohesive a party (or community)
is in a set of votes. Both metrics range from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates that a
member or party is totally disciplined (or cohesive) and 0 otherwise.
3.2 Case Studies
We consider two case studies: Brazil and US. In Brazil, the House of Represen-
tatives consists of 513 seats. A member vote can be either Yes, No, Obstruction
or Absence in each voting session. A Yes or No vote expresses, respectively, an
agreement or disagreement with the given proposition. Both Absence and Ob-
struction mean that the member did not participate in the voting, although an
Obstruction expresses the intention of the member to cause the voting session
to be cancelled due to insufficient quorum. Similarly, the US House of Repre-
sentatives includes 435 seats, and a member vote can be Yes, No or Not Voting,
whereas the last one indicates the member was not present in the voting session.
In our study, we disregard Absence and Not Voting votes, as they do not reflect
any particular inclination of the members with respect to the topic under con-
sideration. However, we do include Obstructions as they reflect an intentional
action of the members and a clear opposition to the topic. Thus, for Brazil, three
different voting options were considered.
For both case studies, we collected voting data from public sources. The
plenary roll call votes of Brazil’s House of Representatives are available through
an application programming interface (API) maintained by the government1.
We collected roll call votes between the 52th and 55th legislatures, from 2003 to
2017. US voting data covering the same 15-year period (i.e., between the 108th
and 115th congresses) was collected through the ProPublica API2. Each dataset
consists of a sequence of the voting session; for each session, the dataset includes
date, time and voting option of each participating member.
In a preliminary analysis of the datasets, we noted that some members had
little attendance to the voting sessions, especially in Brazil. Thus, we chose to fil-
ter our datasets to remove members with low attendance as they introduce noise
to our analyses. Specifically, we removed members that had not attended (thus
had not associated vote) to more than 33% of the voting sessions during each
year3. On average, 19% and 1.98% members were removed from the Brazilian
and US datasets for each year, respectively.
1 http://www2.camara.leg.br/transparencia/dados-abertos/
dados-abertos-legislativo (In Portuguese)
2 https://projects.propublica.org/api-docs/congress-api/
3 This threshold was chosen based on Article 55 of the Brazilian Constitution that
establishes that a deputy or senator will lose her mandate if she does not attend
more than one third of the sessions.
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Table 1: Overview of our datasets.
Brazil
Leg. Year
President
(Party)
# of Voting
Sessions
# of
Votes
# of
Parties
# of
Members
Avg.
PD
SD
PD
52th
2003 Lula (PT) 150 106755 23 435 88.23% 0.08
2004 Lula (PT) 118 71576 23 377 87.43% 0.08
2005 Lula (PT) 81 50616 24 382 88.91% 0.07
2006 Lula (PT) 87 62358 24 419 91.12% 0.05
53th
2007 Lula (PT) 221 190424 31 478 92.45% 0.07
2008 Lula (PT) 157 122482 31 452 92.34% 0.07
2009 Lula (PT) 156 125759 30 465 91.87% 0.06
2010 Lula (PT) 83 63255 29 452 92.46% 0.05
54th
2011 Dilma (PT) 98 78662 29 481 89.34% 0.08
2012 Dilma (PT) 79 60219 28 454 89.56% 0.05
2013 Dilma (PT) 158 115751 29 451 88.70% 0.06
2014 Dilma (PT) 87 66154 28 451 92.93% 0.04
55th
2015 Dilma (PT) 273 231031 28 502 85.84% 0.06
2016
Dilma (PT)
Temer (PMDB)
218 156006 28 452 90.12% 0.05
2017 Temer (PMDB) 230 159704 29 435 89.76% 0.08
United States
Cong. Year
President
(Party)
# of Voting
Sessions
# of
Votes
# of
Parties
# of
Members
Avg.
PD
SD
PD
108th
2003 George W. Bush (R) 623 258867 3 432 95.76% 0.03
2004 George W. Bush (R) 502 203557 3 427 95.11% 0.03
109th
2005 George W. Bush (R) 637 264735 3 432 95.02% 0.03
2006 George W. Bush (R) 511 210592 3 428 94.98% 0.04
110th
2007 George W. Bush (R) 956 297957 2 414 92.23% 0.04
2008 George W. Bush (R) 605 244734 2 426 92.73% 0.04
111th
2009 Barack Obama (D) 929 385344 3 431 93.78% 0.02
2010 Barack Obama (D) 631 253296 3 422 95.34% 0.01
112th
2011 Barack Obama (D) 908 377601 2 428 91.98% 0.01
2012 Barack Obama (D) 621 253812 2 425 91.50% 0.01
113th
2013 Barack Obama (D) 594 245430 2 427 93.04% 0.01
2014 Barack Obama (D) 531 217822 2 426 93.24% 0.01
114th
2015 Barack Obama (D) 662 277732 2 432 94.87% 0.01
2016 Barack Obama (D) 588 241263 2 427 95.11% 0.01
115th 2017 Donald Trump (R) 708 292503 2 427 95.99% 0.00
Table 1 shows an overview of both (filtered) datasets, with Brazil on the top
part of the table and the US on the bottom. The table presents each year cov-
ered, the acting president4 and his/her party5, total number of voting sessions,
total number of member votes, as well as numbers of parties and members occu-
pying seats in the House of Representatives during the year. The two rightmost
columns, Avg. PD and SD PD, present the average and standard deviation of
the Party Discipline computed across all parties.
Starting with the Brazilian dataset, we can see that the number of parties
occupying seats has somewhat grown in recent years, characterizing an increas-
ingly fragmented party system. However, in general, average PD values are very
high (ranging from 85% to 92%), with small variation across parties, indicating
that, despite the fragmentation, most party members have high partisan disci-
pline. Regarding the American dataset, Table 1 shows that the number of voting
sessions is much larger than in Brazil. This is because the API of the Brazilian
4 Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff was impeached from office and, therefore, Brazil
had two Presidents that year.
5 For Brazil: Worker’s Party (PT) and the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party
(PMDB). For the US: Democratic (D) and Republican (R).
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House of Representative provides only data related to votes in plenary, while
the US dataset covers all votes. Moreover, although the numbers of members are
comparable to those in the Brazilian dataset, the number of parties occupying
seats in each year is much smaller. Indeed, only two parties, namely Republican
(R) and Democrat (D), fill all seats in the House of Representatives since the
112th Congress. Thus, unlike the Brazilian case, party fragmentation is not an
issue in the US. Moreover, just like in Brazil, parties have a high party discipline.
3.3 Network Model
We model the dynamics of ideological communities in voting sessions in each
country using graphs as follows. We discretize time into non-overlapping win-
dows of fixed duration. For each time window w analyzed, we create a weighted
and undirected graph Gw(V,A) in which V ={v1, v2, ...vn} is a set of vertices
representing House members and each edge (vi, vj) is weighted by the similarity
of voting positions of members vi and vj . Specifically, the weight of edge (vi, vj)
is given by the ratio of the number of sessions in which both members voted sim-
ilarly to the total number of sessions to which both members attended, during
window w. Since in Brazil, government coalitions are usually made every year,
we choose one year as the time window for analyzing community dynamics.
After building each graph, we noted that all pairs of members voted similarly
at least once in all years analyzed and in both countries and, therefore, all graphs
built are complete. This reflects the fact that some voting sessions are not dis-
criminative of ideology or opinion, as most members (regardless of party) voted
similarly. Thereby, it is necessary to filter out edges that do not contribute to
the detection of ideological communities. To that end, we analyzed the distribu-
tions of edge similarity for all networks. Representative distributions for specific
years, for both Brazil and US, are shown in Figures 1a and 1b, respectively. We
note that while the distributions for US exhibit clear concentrations around very
small (roughly 0.3) and very large (around 0.85) similarity values, the similarity
distributions for Brazil exhibit greater variability, which is consistent with the
greater fragmentation of the party system.
We argue that, for the sake of removing edges from the graphs, a similarity
threshold should not be much smaller than the average partisan discipline of
individual members. That is, two members that have similarity much lower than
their partisan disciplines should not be considered as part of the same ideological
community. On the other hand, the higher the similarity threshold chosen, the
larger the number of edges removed and the more sparse the resulting graph is.
After experimenting with different thresholds, we chose to remove all edges with
weights below the 90th percentile of the similarity distribution for the Brazilian
graphs. For the US, we removed edges with weights below the 55th percentile of
the similarity distribution. Both percentiles correspond roughly to a similarity
value of 80%, which is not much smaller than the average partisan disciplines in
both countries (see Table 1). We removed nodes that become isolated after the
edge filtering, that is, single-node communities are not included in our analyses.
8 Analyzing Ideological Communities in Congressional Voting Networks
0 20 40 60 80 100
Similarity(x)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
P(
X 
 x
)
2007
2008
2009
2010
(a) Brazil
20 40 60 80 100
Similarity(x)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
P(
X 
 x
)
2011
2012
2013
2014
(b) United States
Fig. 1: Cumulative Distribution Function of Edge Similarity.
In sum, we model the voting sessions in each country using two sets of net-
works, one network per year. Then, we use the Louvain Method [7] to identify
ideological communities in each network. This method has been extensively used
to detect network communities in various domains [9, 15, 27]. It is based on the
optimization of modularity [26], a metric to evaluate the structure of clusters in
a network. Modularity is large when the clustering is good and it can reach a
maximum value of 1. In this study, we use modularity and party discipline as
main metrics to assess the cohesiveness of the communities found. The former
captures the quality of the result with respect to the topological structure of
the communities in the network, whereas the latter, computed for the commu-
nities (rather than for individual parties), captures quality in terms of context
semantics. In the next sections, we discuss the results of our analyses.
4 Identifying Ideological Communities
We start our discussion by tackling our first research question (RQ1) and char-
acterizing the ideological communities discovered in both Brazilian and US net-
works. Table 2 shows an overview of all networks for both countries, presenting
some topological properties [13], i.e., numbers of nodes (# of nodes) and edges
(# of edges), number of connected components (# of CC ), average shortest
path length (SPL), average degree, clustering coefficient and density6. Note the
difference between the number of nodes in this table and the number of members
in Table 1, corresponding to nodes that were removed after the edge filtering.
Table 2 also summarizes the characteristics of the ideological communities
identified using the Louvain algorithm. In the four rightmost columns, it presents
the number of communities identified, their modularity (Mod.) as well as average
and standard deviation of the party discipline (Avg PD and SD PD), computed
with respect to the ideological communities.
6 The density of a network is given by the ratio of the total number of existing edges to
the maximum possible number of edges in the graph. The clustering coefficient, on
the other hand, measures the degree at which the nodes of the graph tend to group
together to form triangles, and is defined as the ratio of the number of existing closed
triplets to the total number of open and closed triplets. A triplet is three nodes that
are connected by either two (open triplet) or three (closed triplet) undirected ties.
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Table 2: Characterization of Networks and Ideological Communities
Brazil
Year
# of
Nodes
# of
Edges
# of
CC
Avg.
SPL
Avg.
Degree
Avg.
Clustering
Density
# of
Comm.
Mod.
Avg.
PD
SD
PD
2003 342 9329 5 1.83 55.01 0.65 0.16 8 0.11 95.48% 2.22
2004 326 7079 2 1.90 43.43 0.62 0.13 4 0.14 92.68% 3.36
2005 359 7211 1 3.18 40.17 0.59 0.11 5 0.21 88.32% 3.64
2006 419 8613 1 2.47 41.11 0.61 0.09 4 0.36 90.50% 2.36
2007 427 11394 3 1.77 53.37 0.67 0.12 6 0.14 95.97% 1.26
2008 400 10180 2 1.62 50.90 0.70 0.12 5 0.08 95.78% 1.94
2009 434 10784 2 1.92 49.70 0.66 0.11 4 0.18 91.45% 3.49
2010 446 10151 1 2.42 45.52 0.64 0.10 4 0.19 92.01% 1.29
2011 408 11519 2 1.89 56.47 0.60 0.13 6 0.12 93.69% 3.76
2012 345 6527 3 2.47 46.11 0.48 0.11 4 0.33 87.00% 4.25
2013 449 10094 1 2.21 44.96 0.61 0.10 4 0.38 86.51% 4.18
2014 450 10036 1 2.18 44.60 0.58 0.09 3 0.43 91.14% 1.79
2015 490 12563 1 2.90 51.28 0.69 0.10 5 0.60 85.90% 3.11
2016 425 10159 2 1.44 47.81 0.66 0.11 4 0.38 92.62% 1.83
2017 396 9434 4 1.64 47.65 0.72 0.12 6 0.24 90.25% 3.16
United States
Year
# of
Nodes
# of
Edges
# of
CC
Avg.
SPL
Avg.
Degree
Avg.
Clustering
Density
# of
Comm.
Mod.
Avg.
PD
SD
PD
2003 431 41892 2 1.11 194.39 0.95 0.45 2 0.48 93.60% 1.03
2004 426 40928 2 1.10 192.15 0.95 0.45 2 0.48 92.97% 0.55
2005 431 41892 2 1.10 194.39 0.95 0.45 2 0.48 92.60% 0.79
2006 426 41112 2 1.10 193.01 0.95 0.45 2 0.49 91.45% 0.33
2007 414 38471 2 1.12 185.85 0.94 0.45 2 0.44 91.55% 3.78
2008 424 40729 2 1.11 192.12 0.94 0.45 2 0.46 95.45% 1.97
2009 429 41698 2 1.15 194.40 0.94 0.45 2 0.40 93.86% 2.42
2010 420 39969 1 3.06 190.33 0.95 0.45 3 0.43 94.92% 1.86
2011 426 41119 2 1.18 193.05 0.96 0.45 3 0.44 90.31% 1.91
2012 417 40545 3 1.17 194.46 0.96 0.46 3 0.44 91.63% 1.86
2013 423 40921 2 1.11 193.48 0.96 0.45 2 0.47 93.23% 1.03
2014 418 40735 2 1.08 194.90 0.96 0.46 2 0.48 94.37% 0.34
2015 427 41890 2 1.09 196.21 0.95 0.46 2 0.47 94.40% 1.36
2016 423 40927 2 1.11 193.51 0.95 0.45 2 0.48 94.70% 1.36
2017 423 40928 2 1.09 193.51 0.95 0.45 2 0.46 96.02% 0.44
Starting with the Brazilian networks (top part of Table 2), we can observe
great fluctuation in most topological metrics over the years, but, overall, the net-
works are sparse: the average shortest path length is short, the average clustering
coefficient is moderate and the network density is low. Also, the number of com-
munities identified is much smaller than the total number of parties (see Table
1) confirming the fragmentation and ideological overlap of multiple parties. Yet,
the party discipline of these communities is, on average, very close to, and, in
some cases, slightly larger than the values computed for the individual parties,
despite a somewhat greater standard deviation observed across communities.
Thus, these communities are indeed very cohesive in their voting patterns.
In contrast, the topological structure of the identified communities, as ex-
pressed by the modularity metric, is very weak, especially in the former years.
That is, there is still a lot of similarity across members of different ideological
communities. We note that in the former years the government had greater sup-
port from most parties, voting similarly in most sessions. Such approval dropped
during a period of political turmoil that started in 2012, when the distinction of
ideologies and opinions become more clear [6,33]. This may explain why the mod-
ularity starts low and increases in the most recent years, when there is greater
distinction between different communities. Note that this happens despite the
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large average party discipline maintained by the communities. That is, these two
metrics provide complementary interpretations of the political scenario.
Turning our attention to the US (bottom part of Table 2), we note that,
unlike in Brazil, most metrics remain roughly stable throughout the years. The
networks are much more dense, with higher average clustering coefficient and
density and shortest path length. The number of identified communities coin-
cides with the number of connected components as well as with the number of
political parties (see Table 1) in most years. These communities are more strongly
structured, despite some ideological overlap, as expressed by moderate-to-large
modularity value. Moreover, these communities are consistent in their ideolo-
gies, as expressed by large party disciplines, comparable to the original (party-
level) ones. These metrics reflect the political behavior of a non-fragmented and
stronger two-party system, quite unlike the Brazilian scenario.
In sum, in Brazil, the several parties can be grouped into just a few ideo-
logical communities, with strong disciplined members, although the separation
between communities is not very clear. In the US, on the other hand, ideolog-
ical communities are more clearly defined, both structurally and ideologically,
though some inter-community similarity still remains.
5 Identifying Polarized Communities
As mentioned, the ideological communities identified in the previous section
still share some similarity, particularly for the Brazilian case. In this section, we
address our second research question (RQ2), with the aim of identifying polarized
communities, i.e., communities that have a more clear distinction from the others
in terms of voting behavior. To that end, we take a step further and consider
that members of the same polarized community should not only be neighbors
(i.e., similar to each other) but should also share most of their neighbors. Thus
two members that, despite voting similar to each other, have mostly distinct sets
of neighbors should not be in the same group.
To identify polarized communities, we start with the networks used to identify
the ideological communities and compute the neighborhood overlap for each edge.
The neighborhood overlap of an edge (vi, vj) is the ratio of the number of nodes
that are neighbors of both vi and vj to the number of neighbors of at least one
of vi or vj [13]. The neighborhood overlap of vi and vj is taken as an estimate
of the strength of the tie between the two nodes. Edges with tie strength below
(above) a given threshold are classified as weak (strong) ties. We consider that
weak ties come from overlapping communities, and strong ties are edges within a
polarized community. Thus, edges representing weak ties are removed. As before,
all nodes that become isolated after this second filtering are also removed.
Once again the selection of the best neighborhood overlap threshold was not
clear as it involves a complex tradeoff: larger thresholds lead to more closely
connected communities and higher modularity, which is the goal, but also pro-
duce more sparse graphs, resulting in a larger number of isolated nodes which
are disregarded. Thus, for each network, we selected a threshold that produced
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Fig. 2: Impact of Neighborhood Overlap Threshold for Brazil, 2017 (Selected
threshold in green.).
a good compromise between the two metrics. Figure 2 shows an example of this
trade-off for one specific year (2017) in Brazil, with the selected threshold value
shown in green. For Brazil, the selected threshold fell between 0.40 and 0.55,
while for the United States this range was from 0.1 to 0.28. We then re-executed
the Louvain algorithm to detect (polarized) communities in the new networks.
Table 3 presents the topological properties of the networks as well as the
structural and ideological properties of the identified polarized communities, for
both Brazil and US. Focusing first on the Brazilian networks (top part of the
table), we see that the number of nodes with strong ties decreases drastically (by
up to 66%) as compared to the networks analyzed in Section 4. This indicates the
large presence of House members that, despite great similarity with other mem-
bers, are not strongly tied (as defined above) to them, and thus do not belong
to any polarized community. The number of connected components dropped for
some years and increased for others, suggesting that some components in the first
set of networks were composed of structurally weaker communities or of mul-
tiple smaller communities. Network density, average shortest path length, and
clustering coefficient also dropped, indicating more sparse networks, as expected.
The number of polarized communities somewhat differs from the number of
communities obtained when all (strong and weak) ties are considered, increasing
in most years. This suggests that some ideological communities identified in
Section 4 may be indeed formed by multiple more closely connected subgroups.
Yet, those numbers are still smaller than the number of parties in each year
(Table 1). Moreover, compared to the ideological communities first analyzed,
the polarized communities are stronger both structurally and ideologically, as
expressed by larger values of modularity and average party discipline.
For the US case, the numbers in Table 3 are very similar to those in Table
2. Less than 2% of the nodes have only weak ties and were removed from the
networks in all years. Thus, almost all members have strong ties to each other,
building ideological communities that are, in general, very polarized.
In sum, despite the fragmented party system, polarization can be observed in
Brazil, to some degree, in a number of smaller strongly tied communities. In the
US, on the other hand, almost all members and communities are very polarized.
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Table 3: Characterization of Strongly Tied Networks and Polarized Communities
Brazil
Year
# of
Nodes
# of
Edges
# of
CC
Avg.
SPL
Avg.
Degree
Avg.
Clustering
Density
# of
Comm.
Mod.
Avg.
PD
SD
PD
2003 186 1436 1 1.48 15.44 0.38 0.08 4 0.35 97.78% 0.86
2004 154 866 1 1.52 11.25 0.33 0.07 5 0.36 97.11% 0.57
2005 119 1210 2 1.19 20.34 0.59 0.17 4 0.37 95.40% 0.93
2006 136 590 10 1.37 8.68 0.52 0.06 12 0.57 96.62% 2.16
2007 175 977 3 1.68 11.17 0.32 0.06 6 0.44 97.31% 1.36
2008 216 1019 2 1.94 9.44 0.23 0.04 5 0.42 97.11% 0.46
2009 209 1217 1 1.30 11.65 0.41 0.05 5 0.56 94.57% 1.67
2010 225 726 6 1.45 6.45 0.22 0.02 11 0.51 94.31% 1.80
2011 250 1891 1 1.78 15.13 0.31 0.06 4 0.40 96.56% 0.86
2012 145 1151 3 1.84 29.82 0.48 0.11 6 0.37 94.42% 1.98
2013 318 4437 5 1.77 27.91 0.58 0.08 9 0.47 91.30% 2.17
2014 287 1672 3 1.37 11.65 0.41 0.04 5 0.63 94.04% 1.28
2015 372 6290 6 1.41 33.82 0.64 0.09 9 0.64 93.93% 1.70
2016 269 1726 3 1.43 12.83 0.44 0.04 8 0.63 95.08% 1.21
2017 227 1631 5 1.58 14.37 0.44 0.06 6 0.60 95.25% 2.01
United States
Year
# of
Nodes
# of
Edges
# of
CC
Avg.
SPL
Avg.
Degree
Avg.
Clustering
Density
# of
Comm.
Mod.
Avg.
PD
SD
PD
2003 431 41872 2 1.11 194.30 0.95 0.45 2 0.47 93.60% 1.03
2004 426 40741 2 1.12 191.27 0.95 0.45 2 0.48 92.97% 0.55
2005 431 41886 2 1.11 194.37 0.95 0.45 2 0.47 92.60% 0.79
2006 426 41073 2 1.10 192.83 0.95 0.45 2 0.48 91.45% 0.33
2007 414 38462 2 1.12 185.81 0.94 0.44 2 0.42 91.55% 3.78
2008 423 40708 2 1.11 192.47 0.95 0.45 2 0.43 95.49% 1.93
2009 428 41690 2 1.15 194.81 0.94 0.45 2 0.40 93.89% 2.45
2010 418 39958 2 1.13 191.19 0.95 0.45 3 0.43 94.86% 1.97
2011 422 41112 2 1.15 194.84 0.97 0.46 3 0.45 90.01% 3.16
2012 413 40529 2 1.07 196.27 0.97 0.47 3 0.44 91.70% 2.17
2013 421 40910 2 1.10 194.35 0.96 0.46 2 0.46 93.32% 0.94
2014 417 40717 2 1.08 195.29 0.96 0.46 2 0.48 94.40% 0.38
2015 424 41759 2 1.08 196.98 0.95 0.46 2 0.47 94.53% 1.41
2016 418 40890 2 1.08 195.65 0.96 0.46 3 0.46 95.67% 0.80
2017 421 40923 2 1.08 194.41 0.95 0.46 2 0.48 95.37% 0.11
6 Temporal Analysis
We finally turn to RQ3 and investigate how the polarized communities evolve
over time. To that end, we compute two complementary metrics, namely persis-
tence and normalized mutual information [32, 36], for each pair of consecutive
years. We define the persistence from year x to x+1 as the fraction of all mem-
bers of polarized communities in x who remained in some polarized community in
x+1. A persistence equal to 100% implies that all members of polarized commu-
nities in x remained in some polarized community in x+1. Yet, the membership
of individual communities may have changed as members may have moved to
different communities. To assess the extent of change in community membership
over consecutive years, we compute the normalized mutual information (NMI)
over the communities, taking only members who persisted over the two years.
NMI is based on Shannon entropy of information theory [31]. Given two sets
of partitions X and Y , defining community assignments for nodes, the mutual
information of X and Y can be thought as the informational “overlap” between
X and Y , or how much we learn about Y from X (and about X from Y ). Let
P (x) be the probability that a node picked at random is assigned to community
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Table 4: Temporal Evolution of Polarized Ideological Communities.
Sequential
Years
2003
2004
2004
2005
2005
2006
2007
2008
2008
2009
2009
2010
2011
2012
2012
2013
2013
2014
2015
2016
2016
2017
BR
Pers. 58.24% 46.30% 53.04% 68.26% 63.80% 61.38% 80.08% 67.87% 61.23% 57.85% 57.47%
NMI 0.14 0.16 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.26 0.14 0.59 0.56 0.65 0.58
US
Pers. 98.13% 90.80% 98.36% 97.57% 86.74% 96.24% 96.18% 96.76% 97.85% 97.63% 86.26%
NMI 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.96 0.80 1.00 0.97 0.98
x, P (x, y) be the probability that a node picked at random is assigned to both
x in X and y in Y . Also, let H(X) be the Shannon entropy for X defined as
H(X) = −∑x P (x)logP (x). The NMI of X and Y is defined as:
NMI(X,Y ) =
∑
x
∑
y P (x, y)log
P (x,y)
P (x)P (y)√
H(X)H(Y )
(2)
NMI ranges from 0 (all members changed their communities) to 1 (all mem-
bers remained in the same communities).
Table 4 shows persistence (Pers) and NMI results for all pairs of consecutive
years and both countries. For Brazil (BR), the values of persistence varied over
the years, ranging from 46% to 80%. Thus, a significant number of new nodes
join polarized communities every year. Indeed, in most years, roughly half of the
members of polarized communities are newcomers. Moreover, the values of NMI
are small, especially in the earlier years, reflecting great change also in terms
of nodes switching communities. This is consistent with a period of less clear
distinction between the communities and weaker polarization, as discussed in
the previous sections. Since 2012, the values of NMI fall around 0.6, reflecting
greater stability in community membership. For the US, on the other hand, both
persistence and NMI are very large, approaching the maximum (1). Almost all
members persist in their polarized communities over the years.
A visualization of some of these results is shown in Figure 3 which presents
the flow of nodes across polarized communities over the years of 2015 to 2017
in Brazil and in the US. Each vertical line represents a community, and its
length represents the number of members belonging to that community who
persisted in some polarized community in the following year. Thus, communities
for which all members did not persist in any polarized community in the following
year are not represented in the figure. Recall that, according to Table 3, the
number of polarized communities in Brazil in 2015, 2016 and 2017 was 9, 8 and
6, respectively. A cross-analysis of these results with Figure 3a indicates that
members of only 4 out of 9 polarized communities in 2015 persisted polarized in
the following year. Moreover, two polarized communities in 2016 were composed
of only newcomers and both communities disappeared in 2017 (as they do not
appear in the figure). Similarly, one polarized community in 2017 was composed
of only newcomers. The figure also shows a great amount of switching, merging
and splitting across communities over the years. Figure 3b, on the other hand,
illustrates the greater stability of community membership in the US.
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2015 2016 2017
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2015 2016 2017
(b) United States
Fig. 3: Dynamics of Polarized Communities over 2015-2017.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We have proposed a methodology to analyze the formation and evolution of ideo-
logical and polarized communities in party systems, applying it to two strikingly
different political contexts, namely Brazil and the US. Our analyses showed
that the large number of political parties in Brazil can be reduced to only a
few ideological communities, maintaining their original ideological properties,
that is well disciplined communities, with a certain degree of redundancy. These
communities have distinguished themselves both structurally and ideologically
in the recent years, a reflection of the transformation that Brazilian politics
has been experiencing since 2012. For the US, the country’s strong and non-
fragmented party system leads to the identification of ideological communities
in the two main parties throughout the analyzed period. However, there are
still some highly similar links crossing the community boundaries. Moreover, for
some years, a third community emerged, without however affecting the strong
discipline, ideology and community structure of the American party system.
We then took a step further and focused on polarized communities by consid-
ering only tightly connected groups of nodes. We found that in Brazil, despite
the party fragmentation and the existence of some degree of similarity even
across the identified ideological communities, it is still possible to find a subset
of members that organize themselves into strongly polarized ideological commu-
nities. However, these communities are highly dynamic, changing a large portion
of their membership over consecutive years. In the US, on the other hand, most
ideological communities identified are indeed highly polarized and their mem-
bership remain mostly unchanged over the years.
As future work, we intend to further analyze ideological communities in our
datasets by characterizing members in terms of their centrality as well as propos-
ing new metrics of tie strength for this particular domain. We also intend to
extend our study to other party systems.
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